Effects Of The P-51 In World War II Essay, Research Paper
Abstract
This paper deals with the contributions of the P-51 Mustang to
the eventual victory of the Allies in Europe during World War II. It
describes the war scene in Europe before the P-51 was introduced,
traces the development of the fighter, its advantages, and the
abilities it was able to contribute to the Allies’ arsenal. It
concludes with the effect that the P-51 had on German air superiority,
and how it led the destruction of the Luftwaffe. The thesis is that:
it was not until the advent of the North American P-51 Mustang
fighter, and all of the improvements, benefits, and side effects
that it brought with it, that the Allies were able to achieve air
superiority over the Germans.
Table of Contents
Introduction
Reasons for the Pre-P-51 Air Situation
The Pre-P-51 Situation
The Allied Purpose in the Air War
The Battle at Schweinfurt
The Development of the P-51
The Installation of the Merlin Engines
Features, Advantages, and Benefits of the P-51
The P-51’s Battle Performance
The Change in Policy on Escort Fighter Function
P-51’s Disrupt Luftwaffe Fighter Tactics
P-51’s Give Bombers Better Support
Conclusion
Works Cited
Introduction
On September 1, 1939, the German military forces invaded Poland
to begin World War II. This invasion was very successful because of
its use of a new military strategic theory — blitzkrieg. Blitzkrieg,
literally “lightning war,” involved the fast and deadly coordination
of two distinct forces, the Wermacht and the Luftwaffe. The Wermacht
advanced on the ground, while the Luftwaffe destroyed the enemy air
force, attacked enemy ground forces, and disrupted enemy communication
and transportation systems. This setup was responsible for the
successful invasions of Poland, Norway, Western Europe, the Balkans
and the initial success of the Russian invasion. For many years
after the first of September, the air war in Europe was dominated by
the Luftwaffe. No other nation involved in the war had the experience,
technology, or numbers to challenge the Luftwaffe’s superiority. It
was not until the United States joined the war effort that any great
harm was done to Germany and even then, German air superiority
remained unscathed. It was not until the advent of the North American
P-51 Mustang fighter, and all of the improvements, benefits, and side
effects that it brought with it, that the Allies were able to achieve
air superiority over the Germans.
Reasons for the Pre-P-51 Air Situation
The continued domination of the European skies by the Luftwaffe
was caused by two factors, the first of which was the difference in
military theory between the Luftwaffe and the Royal Air Force. The
theories concerning the purpose and function of the Luftwaffe and RAF
were exactly opposite and were a result of their experiences in World
War I. During WW I, Germany attempted a strategic bombing effort
directed against England using Gothas (biplane bombers) and Zeppelins
(slow-moving hot-air balloons) which did not give much of a result.
This, plus the fact that German military theory at the beginning of WW
II was based much more on fast quick results (Blitzkrieg), meant that
Germany decided not to develop a strategic air force. The Luftwaffe
had experienced great success when they used tactical ground-attack
aircraft in Spain (i.e. at Guernica), and so they figured that their
air force should mainly consist of this kind of planes. So Germany
made the Luftwaffe a ground support force that was essentially an
extension of the army and functioned as a long- range, aerial
artillery. The RAF, on the other hand, had experimented with
ground-attack fighters during WW I, and had suffered grievous casualty
rates. This, combined with the fact that the British had been deeply
enraged and offended by the German Gotha and Zeppelin attacks on their
home soil, made them determined to develop a strategic air force that
would be capable of bombing German soil in the next war. Thus, at the
beginning of WW II, the RAF was mostly a strategic force that
consisted of heavy bombers and backup fighters, and lacked any
tactical dive- bombers or ground-attack fighters. (Boyne 21)
The Pre-P-51 Situation
Because of these fundamental differences, the situation that
resulted after the air war began was: bombers in enemy territory vs.
attack planes. The “in enemy territory” was the second reason for the
domination of the Luftwaffe. At the beginning of WW II, and for many
years afterward, the Allies had no long-range escort fighters, which
meant that the bombers were forced to fly most of their long journeys
alone. (Perret 104) Before the P-51 was brought into combat, the main
Allied fighters were the American P-47 Thunderbolt and the British
Spitfire, neither of which had a very long range. The rule-of-thumb
for fighter ranges was that they could go as far as Aachen, which was
about 250 miles from the Allied fighters’ home bases in England,
before they had to turn around. Unfortunately, most of the bombers’
targets were between 400 and 700 miles from England. (Bailey 2-3)
This meant that bombers could only be escorted into the Benelux
countries, northern France, and the very western fringe of Germany.
When these unescorted, ungainly, slow, unmaneuverable bombers flew
over Germany, they were practically sitting ducks for the fast German
fighters. On the other hand, the bombers were equipped with several
machine guns and were able to consistently shoot down some of their
attackers. Because of this, “U.S. strategists were not yet convinced
of the need for long-range fighters; they continued to cling to the
belief that their big bomber formations could defend themselves over
Germany.” (Bailey 153)
The Allied Purpose in the Air War
The Allies knew that they had to drive German industry into the
ground in order to win the war. Since the factories, refineries,
assembly-lines, and other industry-related structures were all inland,
the only way to destroy them was by sending in bombers. The only way
that the bombers could achieve real success was by gaining air
superiority, which meant that nearly all of the bombers would be able
to drop their bombs without being harassed by fighters, and return
home to fight another day. The problem with this sequence was that the
Allies did not have this superiority, (Bailey 28) because their
bombers were consistently getting shot down in fairly large numbers,
by the German fighters that kept coming. The Allies soon realized
that in order to gain this superiority, they would have to destroy
more German fighters. In order to destroy the fighters, they would
have to be forced into the air in greater numbers. In order to get
more German fighters into the air, the more sensitive German
industries would have to be attacked with more aggression. Following
this logic, the Allies began a intensified bombing effort that
resulted in the famous bombings of Hamburg (July 24-28, 1943) and
Ploesti (August 1, 1943), among others. And, indeed, this did cause
more fighters to come up to meet and engage the bombers.
Unfortunately, the bombers were overwhelmed by the German opposition,
and their losses soon began to increase. (Copp 359) The Allied air
forces had, in effect, pushed a stick into a hornets’ nest, hoping to
kill the hornets when they came out, and been stung by the ferocity of
their response.
The Battle at Schweinfurt
The culminating point of this backfiring plan was the second
bombing raid on Schweinfurt, which occurred on October 14, 1943.
Schweinfurt was the location of huge ball-bearing factories that
supplied most of the ball-bearings for the entire German military. The
U.S. Eighth Air Force had staged a fairly successful raid on the same
city two months earlier, but the second time around, the Germans were
ready for them. The official report afterwards said that the Luftwaffe
“turned in a performance unprecedented in its magnitude, in the
cleverness with which it was planned, and in the severity with which
it was executed.” Of the 229 bombers that actually made it all the way
to Schweinfurt, 60 were shot down, and 17 more made it home, but were
damaged beyond repair. This was a 26.5% battle loss rate for the
Americans, while the Germans only lost 38 airplanes the whole day,
from all causes. (Boyne 327) This battle was one of the key battles of
the war, and undeniably proved to the Allies that the bomber offensive
could not continue without a long-range fighter escort. (Copp 444)
Even before October of ‘43, some had begun to realize the need
for this kind of fighter. In June, the Commanding General of the Army
Air Forces, General Hap Arnold, wrote a memo to his Chief of Staff,
Major General Barney Giles, which said:
This brings to my mind the absolute necessity for building a
fighter airplane that can go in and out with the bombers.
Moreover, this fighter has got to go into Germany. . . . Whether
you use an existing type or have to start from scratch is your
problem. Get to work on this right away because by January ‘44, I
want a fighter escort for all our bombers from the U.K. into
Germany. (Copp 413-414)
The Development of the P-51
In April of 1940, “Dutch” Kindleberger, president of North
American Aviation, visited Sir Henry Self, the head of the aircraft
division of the British Purchasing Commission, asking if Britain would
like to buy some of his B-25 bombers. Self was not interested in
buying any more bombers, but was interested in buying a good fighter.
He directed Kindleberger to the Curtiss company, who had a new fighter
design, but were too busy building P-40’s to do anything with it.
Kindleberger went to Curtiss and bought their design for $56,000. He
promised Self to have the planes ready by September of 1941. The
prototype of the NA-73, as it was called, was ready to fly in October
of 1940 and proved to have an excellent design. The NA-73 had a
revolutionary wing design that allowed it to fly at high speeds
without adverse compression effects. In other planes, as they
approached a certain speed, usually around 450 mph, the air would be
flowing around the wing at nearly the speed of sound, putting huge
amounts of pressure on the wings, which were unable to deal with the
stress. The NA-73 did not have this problem, which meant it could fly
safely at much higher speeds. Another revolutionary idea in the plane
was the way heated air from the radiator was dealt with. The NA-73’s
engineers designed it to expel this air and boost the planes speed by
15 or 25 mph. The engineers also worked especially hard on making the
plane as aerodynamic as possible, and so they positioned the radiator
in a new place, made the fuselage as narrow as possible, and set the
cockpit low in the fuselage. (Perret 118-119) It was at this point
that an error was made that made the Mustang useless as a long-range
offensive fighter. When the NA-73 was mass produced as the P-51,
it was powered by a 1550 horsepower air-cooled Allison engine, which
did not have a supercharger and lost performance above 11,800 ft. At
high altitudes air pressure goes down, and so there is less oxygen in
a given amount of air, which means that engines do not burn as
cleanly, and so lose power. Superchargers compress air before it is
pumped into the engine cylinders so that there is enough oxygen for
the engine to function well. The early Allison-engined planes did not
have the supercharger, and so were limited to low-altitude operations.
Even without a high- altitude capability, the Mustang was an
impressive plane and was bought in quantity by the RAF. It flew its
first mission on May 10, 1942, against Berck-sur-Mer on the French
coast. (Grant 17-18)
The Installation of the Merlin Engines
So, for the next eighteen months, the P-51A’s continued to fly
with the RAF, doing their unexceptional jobs well. After the plane
began to go into combat, some people began looking into the idea of
fitting the Mustang with a more powerful engine. As the RAF said, it
was “a bloody good airplane, only it needs a bit more poke.” (Grant
22) One day, an RAF test pilot was flying a P-51A and the thought
occurred to him that the plane could be fitted with a Rolls-Royce
Merlin engine, which had about 300 more horsepower and included a
supercharger. He suggested it to Rolls-Royce’s Chief Aerodynamic
Engineer and “both men realized that the combination of this sort of
performance with the aerodynamically efficient airframe of the
Mustang would revolutionize its potential.” (Grant 22) This plan was
duly carried out and in November 1943, the first group of P-51B’s
arrived in England.
Features, Advantages, and Benefits of the P-51
This final Mustang design was superior to anything else that
flew at the time. The P-51B had a huge internal gasoline tank capacity
(around 425 gallons) and its engine was very economical, using about
half the gasoline of other American fighters. This meant its range was
1080 miles and could be extended to 2600 miles when extra drop-tanks
were attached to the wings. This made its range far more than any
Allied or German fighter’s. As far as performance went, it was
superior to all others as well. Neither of the other two main American
fighters could compete; the P-47 was too heavy and the P-38 had too
many technical problems. The British fighters, the Spitfire and the
Hurricane did not have the range, speed, or power. But most important
was its superiority over the German fighters, the most important of
which were the FW-190 and the Me-109. The Mustang was 50 mph faster
than the Germans up to 28,000 ft beyond which it was much faster than
the FW-190 and still substantially faster than the Me-109. The
Mustang had between 3000 and 4000 lbs more weight, and so was able to
outdive either German plane. The tightness of its turns was much
better than the Me-109 and slightly better than the FW-190. (Grant 31,
Boyne 389-390, Bailey 153) The result of all of this was that the
Allies now had a plane that could go with the bombers all the way to
and from their targets, fight and defeat the bombers’ German
attackers, and not run out of fuel.
The P-51’s Battle Performance
So, at the end of 1943 and the beginning of 1944, the new
American P-51B’s began arriving in England in force. (Dupuy 34) For
the first few months of the year, the Mustangs were settling in and
having their systems perfected. But by March, the Mustangs had
decisively taken control. The arrival and subsequent heavy use of the
P-51’s had several effects. The first effect that the Mustangs had was
in the running air battles over Europe. Before the beginning of 1944,
the bombers had been alone as they approached their faraway targets.
But the P-51 changed this, and quickly made an impression on all
concerned, enemy and ally alike. For example, on January 11, 1944, the
Eighth Air Force launched its first deep penetration of Germany with
P-51 coverage. The bombers’ targets were the cities of Oschersleben
and Halberstadt, where many German planes were being constructed. When
they arrived, there were 49 Mustangs covering a force of around 220
bombers. Even though the bombers suffered heavy casualties, they
were able to inflict substantial damage on their target factories. But
the most significant thing about the battle was the shining
performance of the P-51’s. Since the bombers were attacking two
different cities, the Mustang force had to divide into two groups, to
support the different attacks. Because of the sensitive nature of the
bombers’ targets, the Luftwaffe came out in force to defend their
factories. During the ensuing melee, the 49 P-51’s shot down 15 enemy
planes without suffering a single loss. Major Howard, the group’s
leader, was credited with four kills within minutes. (Bailey 155) In
the grand scheme of things, this battle was insignificant, but it goes
to show how much of advantage the P-51’s had over their German
counterparts. Considering that these were essentially first-time
pilots in the Mustangs’ first big battle, this is very impressive.
The Change in Policy on Escort Fighter Function
Another thing happened at the same time as the arrival of the
P-51 that greatly aided the Allies and fully utilized the great
capabilities of the Mustang. Before the beginning of 1944, the bomber
escort’s primary function was to fly alongside the bombers, repel any
attacks made on the bombers, and generally make sure the bombers
stayed safe. Indeed, the motto of the Eighth Air Force Fighter Command
was “Our Mission is to Bring the Bombers Back Alive.” One day at the
beginning of the year, Jimmy Doolittle, who was the commander of the
Eighth Air Force, saw a plaque on the wall with this motto on it and
said, “That’s not so. Your mission is to destroy the German Air Force.
. .Take that damned thing down.” (Copp 456) And just days before, in
his New Year’s Day address to the Eighth Air Force command, General
Arnold had said, “My personal message to you-this is a MUST- is
to destroy the enemy air force wherever you find them, in the air, on
the ground and in the factories.” (Copp 456) What this meant was that
the escort fighters were not tied to the bombers anymore, and were
free to roam over the countryside and through the towns and cities,
destroying at will. The sweeping Mustangs were released to ravage
German convoys, trains, antiaircraft gun emplacements, warehouses,
airfields, factories, radar installations, and other important things
that would be impractical to be attacked by bombers. The fighters were
also able to attack German fighters when they were least prepared for
it, like when they were taking off or forming up in the air. What made
this possible was the increase in the number of American planes
present in Europe. This increase in the number of Allied planes
compared to the number of German planes continued to the point that,
on D-Day, the Allies used 12,873 aircraft while the Germans were only
able to muster a mere 300. (Overy 77) By using this overwhelming
numerical advantage, the Allied fighters were able to swamp their
opponents in an unstoppable flood of planes.
P-51’s Disrupt Luftwaffe Fighter Tactics
This increase in the number of fighters plus the change in
fighter philosophy allowed the escorts to cover the bombers while
simultaneously ranging far from the bomber stream and destroying all
that they could find. This caused the disruption of several effective
German fighter tactics that had been used successfully in the past.
One of these tactics was the deployment of slow, ungainly German
planes that would fly around the bomber formations, out of gun range,
and report back on where the bombers were and where their weak spots
were. The free-ranging P-51’s soon wiped out these planes. Another
popular tactic was to mount rocket launchers on the wings of some of
these slower craft, have them linger just out of range of the bombers’
guns, and send rockets flying into the bomber formations. These rocket
attacks were terrifying to the bomber crews, and often broke up
formations, sending some planes to the ground. Obviously, these
attacks also came to a halt. Most importantly, the fast German
fighters had to change their attack tactics. Beforehand, they would
fly alongside the formations and wait for the right moment to swoop in
and attack a bomber. Now, they were forced to group together several
miles away from the bombers, and then turn and made a mad rush at the
bombers, hoping to inflict sufficient damage on one pass to shoot down
some number of enemy bombers. They could not afford to stay with the
bombers for very long for fear of being attacked by the Mustangs.
(Perret 293) Indeed, soon after the P-51’s entered onto the scene,
Hermann Goering, the commander of the Luftwaffe, recommended that the
German defensive fighters avoid combat with the P-51, and only attack
bomber formations when there were no fighters around. The result of
all of this is that the American fighters, led by the P-51’s, soon
began to gain air superiority. Not long after Goering’s
recommendation, a sarcastic Luftwaffe officer commented that the
safest flying in the world was to be an American fighter over Germany.
(Dupuy 35-36) It is obvious that the P-51, once it was supplied to the
Eighth Air Force in great quantities, and unleashed by Doolittle and
Arnold’s new fighter policies, soon took a heavy toll on German air
superiority.
P-51’s Give Bombers Better Support
Another profound effect that the increased fighter coverage had
was on the most important people, the bombers. After the entrance of
the P-51, and the virtual elimination of the German fighter threat,
the bombers were in much less danger from German fighters. The result
of the decreased danger to the bombers is subtle, but obvious when
thought about. Imagine a bomber crew sitting in their cramped plane,
unable to move around or evade attack during their bombing run while
numerous German fighters speed past their plane firing at them. Second
lieutenant William Brick, the bombardier of a B-17 bomber, tells about
the day he flew to Linz, Austria on a bombing run:
. . . The remainder of the run must be perfectly straight and
level, without the slightest deviation, or our five-
thousand-pound bomb load will fall wide of the target. No evasive
action is possible. . . Then comes the sickening rattle of
machine-gun bullets and cannon fire hitting our ship; ignoring
the flak from the antiaircraft batteries, German fighter planes
zoom in so close that it seems they will ram us. . . Even at the
sub-zero temperatures of this altitude, salty sweat pours down my
face and burns my eyeballs. Cursing and praying, I am gripped by
the same brand of helpless fear that fliers experience during
every bomb run. I feel the terror in my hands, in my stomach,
even in my feet. Long after returning from the mission, its
effects will remain etched indelibly on my face. . . . (Brick 61)
This kind of terror experienced by the entire crew of the bombers was
sure to affect their concentration and their carefulness. Indeed, “it
is an undeniable, if unquantifiable, fact that it is easier to bomb
precisely when you know you will probably not be shot out of the sky.”
(Boyne 341)
Conclusion
In the end, the way that the Allied air forces gained air
superiority was by destroying its opposition. The ways in which the
fighters were able to destroy German fighters were diverse. The
fighters utilized their high speed and maneuverability to fly
low-level strafing missions that ranged over large expanses of
territory and destroyed many Luftwaffe craft on the ground. This
tactic was responsible for the destruction of many dozens of fighters
that were unable to go on and fight in the air. Another way that the
Allied fighters destroyed their opposition, and the most important
way, was by luring them into the air. Going back to the hornets’ nest
analogy, the Allies stopped pushing the stick and decided to bide
their time until the moment was right. When they did start pushing the
stick into the nest again, they were armed with a metaphoric
insecticide. In real life, this “insecticide” was the P-51.
Beforehand, the Allies had nothing that could stop the “hornets” and
so were helpless to stop their attack. But after they had developed an
“insecticide” capable of killing the “hornets,” they proceeded to lure
the hornets into the open where they could be destroyed. In real life,
the bombers were the lure that brought the Luftwaffe into the air.
Using the long-range Mustangs, the Allies were able to make their
bombing raids more effective and more deadly to Germany. The
approaching end of the Third Reich was enough to get the German
fighters into the air to try to stop the bombers from wrecking their
war effort. “Air superiority had been won not by bombing the enemy’s
factories into oblivion; instead, it was won by the long-range
fighter, using the bomber formations as bait to entice the Luftwaffe
to fight.” (Boyne 338) With the advent of great numbers of the highly
superior P-51 Mustang, the German fighters that came up to attack the
bombers quickly met their match and were easily repelled by the
Mustangs.
—
Works Cited
Bailey, Ronald H. The Air War in Europe. Alexandria, Virginia:
Time-Life Books, 1979. A simple, straight-forward book that includes
much background on the development of military aviation, and includes
many pictures that chronicle the air war.
Boyne, Walter J. Clash of Wings: World War II in the Air. New York:
Simon & Schuster, 1994. A very informative and user- friendly book
that dealt with the air aspect of all fronts and theaters of WWII. It
includes much data on numerous planes in its appendices.
Brick, William. “Bombardier.” American History, April 1995, pp. 60-65.
A short magazine article following the story of how a U.S. airman was
shot down over Austria, and his subsequent imprisonment by the Nazis.
Copp, DeWitt S. Forged in Fire: Strategy and Decisions in the Airwar
over Europe, 1940-1945. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company,
1982. A book dealing mostly with the U.S. involvement in the War, with
particular emphasis on the politics of the military officials, and how
the major strategic decisions were made.
Dupuy, Trevor Nevitt. The Air War in the West: June 1941 to April
1945. New York: Franklin Watts, Inc., 1963. A short, very basic book
that did not go into depth, but did cover its material well.
Grant, William Newby. P-51 Mustang. London: Bison Books Limited, 1980.
A relatively short book, but one that dealt solely with the P-51, and
went into considerable depth concerning its construction and use
during WWII and in later conflicts.
Overy, R.J. The Air War: 1939-1945. New York: Stein and Day
Publishers, 1980. A fairly dry book that dealt mostly with the
economics and generalities of the air war, without dealing too much
with the actual fighting.
Perret, Geoffrey. Winged Victory: The Army Air Forces in World War II.
New York: Random House, 1993. A good book that covered its topic well,
although in-depth discussion of the contributions of the other allies’
forces is not dealt with.