Describe And Discuss Kehr?s Reasons For Believing That The Rejection Of An English Alliance Was Due Essay, Research Paper
Kehr?s essays
are united by the title ?Primat der Innenpolitik? since Kehr?s take on the
Wilhelmine and Birmarckian Reichs was that the Rankean ideal of a Primat der
Aussenpolitik based on the coordination and common goals of the nation state
was not just outdated, but simply a bourgeois illusion.? Kehr refers to the idea of ?objective? and
?autonomous? foreign policy as being absurd and that social stratification and
domestic politics were more important in foreign politics.? The zenith of this idea was the way in which
the possibility Anglo-German alliance was handled.? Claiming that Miquel?s Sammlungspolitik provided the bases
for German foreign policy, Kehr points out that the English failure to assess
the nature of the war without examining their own foreign policy was as grave a
sin as to look at German foreign policy without looking at German domestic
policy.? Foreign policy has adversaries
and allies to deal with, but does so in order to meet the needs of its
people.? As a part of
his thesis, Kehr says that the ?social conflicts of the nineties set foreign
policy on a course that encouraged expansion of the fleet and rejection of the
English alliance.?? The forces of
conservatism that traditionally used the national superstructure to maintain
the socio-economic status quo were striving to maintain a more backward state
than the type of state advocated by the Burgertum.? In Germany this had the effect if protecting the interests of
agrarian capitalism against the interests of industrial and commercial
capitalism.? Moreover, the need to
suppress the massively expanding proletariat, a child of such commerce, was
another objective of the forces conservatism. Kehr also saw bourgeois
nationalism, the being that constructed the ?Nation-State?, as using domestic
politics as a defence mechanism against more advanced and capable economic
rivals on behalf of the agrarian sector, and as being a means to cut out
competition for all of Germany?s exporters.?
It was this common purpose that created the Sammlungspolitik. The
Sammlungspolitik was a stateless collection that sought collaboration between
the wealthy classes, now including the Burgertum, that agreed to remain in the
state apparatus but never to seek to dominate it.? Their governing interest was subduing the proletariat and
maintaining their own status.? The
Junkers were not the hard-working farmers of the eighteenth century, but rather
high level aristocrats whose tastes needed supporting.? The social-insurance policy, the
Penitentiary Bill and the Subversion Bills were all important anti proletarian
domestic policies.? Not satisfied with
the Bismarckian style of use of foreign policy, whereby emergencies could be
generated to allow him to better control the situation, the Sammlungspolitik
bloc wished to use Weltpolitik to create a grandiose uncontinental foreign
policy to manipulate.? Weltpolitik, the
increased domestic power it would bring in the fledgling Rechtstaat and the
prestige it would bring to denigrate Germany?s socialists and democrats were
all issues that would provide the support of the uneasy alliance. Where
nationalism had been the antagonist of dynastic feudalism, that is to say, for
social development, nationalism came to be turned upon the proletariat as a
weapon for social reaction.?? Kehr does
however seem to forget the rather important issue of forced export to colonies
that these exporters might have considered a rather important point.In foreign
policy terms, Germany faced two blocs in the nineteenth century.? The bourgeois ?business as usual? British
with their industry and the autocratic Russia?s grain producing power were the
opposite sides of the coin and neither were acceptable to the alliance.? However, despite these two contrasting
examples, German agrarian? conservatives
still believed that a Machstaat could base itself economically on
agriculture and reject the British model.?
The inability to pay an army in an agrarian society never really seemed
to occur to these most determined proponents of the Machtstaat.? The German conservatives, according to
Kehr, were not provoking the Anglo-German antagonism in the name of
intellectual values, ?heroes against shopkeepers,? but were defending their
socio-economic position against a more potent economic power even though it
would damage the nation as a whole.?
Once again, the Sammlungspolitik placed self-interest before the national
interest.? Hostility and anxiety regarding
the British were multiplied by the defeat of the Boers at Kimberley and the
Modder River ? a defeat for the agrarians apparently as big as Koeniggratz for
Napoleon to the mindset of the agrarians, who came to realise the power of the
British industrial machine. To compare Koeniggratz with these events is
something of an exaggeration by the revisionist. Taking action against the
potential of the British to race across the East Elbian grainfields, as their
industrial might apparently had in South Africa, the agrarians stopped opposing
the building of a fleet, the ultimate expression of fear of a naval island
nation off one?s seaboard. The fleet was backed by industry as a means of
beating off its English commercial rival: the fleet was a sustainable contract
for them even if war broke out.? This
was another piece of Sammlungspolitik. The fleet?s building required the
agrarians to drop their patriarchal outlook and anti-capitalist attacks on such
institutions as the stock exchange. It is highly
unlikely that the Transvaal, Sino-Japanese or Spanish-American wars were seen
as a portent to an age of conflict as claimed so much as a pretext for
preparing for war for class reasons.?
Given the Anglo-Russian conflicts in the Far East, Germany was in an era
of little threat and so the tariffs and the fleet policy can be viewed as they
should be ? as symptoms of domestic political struggles.? The Navy Laws
brought the only apparent foreign concern of the agrarians to bear.? Their realisation of the primacy of the
world economy, with its Russian Grain Mountains and American grain prairies ?
an economy unfavourable to the ramshackle inefficient East Elbian estates ? led
to attempts to shut off the national economy (which they could dominate) from
the outside.? This shows a subordination
of the national state to their interests, in that the economic effects of the
tariffs would be beneficial to them alone. Moreover, the proposed Tariff
legislation of 1902 was an expression of the Sammlungspolitik?s collaboration;
the tariffs were a trade-off for agrarian support in passing the Navy Laws. The industrial
bourgeoisie had no choice but to put up with the grain tariff, a supposed
preparation for the potential blockade during a period of no foreign policy
concerns, so indicating the power of these ruling classes over the indignant
ruled classes.? Despite a marked
decrease in living standards due to the tariffs, the public sentiment had no
outlet.. No matter
their dislike of the state, the conservatives needed to keep the English at
arm?s length.? Foreign policy, the fleet
and Weltpolitik were all means of preserving the Junker class.? On the other hand, the Baghdad Railway
scheme was a manifestation of an anti-Russian sentiment and so long as the
conservatives remained entrenched, there could be no choosing between either
the agrarian Russians or the dark, satanic mills of England, so forcing the two
parties to join forces.? The
Sammlungspolitik created a situation where the alliance of industry and
agriculture seconded all other classes of interest.? It was in the interests of ?iron and rye? that Kehr sees the
rejection of English attempts at conciliation and alliance, the building of the
fleet and the grain tolls.? These
personal interests governing foreign policy were social and economic, but never
once international. This is exemplified by the
German voluntary support of Britain?s blockade of Russia just after the
collapse of the talks between England and Germany.? The conflict of a state entirely reliant on its liberal industrialists,
yet run by its agrarians forced such an inconsistent action.? The blockade on Russian grain was
inconsistent with competition with England, yet it was followed through without
hesitation to protect the ruling classes.?
The protective tariff proposal, the Penitentiary Bill and the second
Naval Law were all policies, as valid, ethical and moderate as the Anglophobic
and Anti-Russian sentiments of the Sammlungspolitik. I would
generally agree with Kehr?s sentiment, but with the proviso that Kehr in his
revisionism is occasionally too radical.?
Although I would agree, in AJP Taylor?s words that ?patriotism is a
luxury that only those without private interests can afford?,? attributing too much significance to the
Sammlungspolitik and perhaps forgetting the crime listed in his essay Englandhass.? In his haste to condemn the diplomatic
historians, Kehr forgets them altogether.?
Moreover, in his haste to condemn the right, he forgets the
corroborative influence of the left.?
More surpringly, however, he forgets the importance of such blocs as the
Reichstag and the Imperial Court. Wilhelm II?s
appointment as Bismarck?s successor, Caprivi, actively sought alliance with
England, a policy favoured by the Social Democrats and, in his attempts to
further expand the army, he sought war on Russia. War seemed likely as part of
a liberal bloc with England, a war conducted with French cooperation.? The increase of military power was thus
welcomed by the left throughout the period as a means to destroying the Russian
autocracy.? Engels wrote ?Rise,
therefore, if Russia begins a war ? Rise against Russia and her allies, whoever
they may be!?? Bebel, the SPD leader,
said in the Reichstag in 1892 ?Present-day Social Democracy is a sort of
preparatory school of militarism.? The transfer
of influence to Caprivi?s marshalship saw tremendous skill in his handling of
the Centre Party (a pair of words one seldom sees used in Kehr?s work),but
through his wrangling, Prussian influence began shrinking in the Reichstag. The
populist Caprivi?s democratic leanings started to show through but he was
unable ?to satisfy Germany without displeasing the Emperor? as Eulenberg would
describe the trick of good Chancellorship, and his successor in 1894, Hohenlowe
took it upon himself to be a new Bismarck.?
Whereas Caprivi had believed in the importance of universal suffrage ?
the junior partner in Bismarck?s reign to the infuence private parties ? the
old order tried, without great success to reassert itself. The Reich wished to
return to its old ways, manipulating parties, states and the smaller states,
but the days of the Iron Chancellor were passed, especially after Caprivi?s
meddling.? Hohenlowe did this by copying
old Bismarckian tricks and policies.? No
more demagogy, no more encouragement of German Austrians and the bolstering of
authoritarian (even anti-German) aristocracy in Austria-Hungary.? There was no more support for the Habsburgs
in the Balkans, nor sympathy for the Poles.?
There was an end to conciliation with England.? Colonial ambitions resumed, and in 1895, the Kruger Telegram, a
poor imitation of the 1870 Ems Telegram, provoked open conflict with
England.? Weltpolitik was not
just an industrialist demand that would require Tirpitz?s fleet, nor just a
search for markets, but was also apparently important for the journalists,
writers and university professors who wanted to taste the successes of Sadowa
and Sedan.? The Prussian bureaucracy who
were still trying to reign Germany back to within Bismarckian limits was the
only brake on the new incautious nature of the government, swept along on a
tide of ambition.? According to AJP
Taylor, the timidity of the German middle class would inflict the punishment of
German ambition on the whole world. Wilhelm?s
assertion that Germany?s policy was one of ?Full steam ahead!? was a lie in so
many ways.? Not only were they intending
to return to Bismarckian politics, as opposed to pressing forwards, but they
were moving at great speed with no real direction. When he told Buelow to be
?his Bismarck,? the intention was to ?sell? the old order to the German
masses.? Buelow slipped and slithered
through, and became known as the ?Eel,? he himself joking that he was like hair
grease.? The result was Weltpolitik on
the cheap, led by the Chancellor, a figure almost forgotten by Kehr, and
encouraged by the Emperor, another cameo role in Kehr?s vision. It seems to me
that whilst Kehr lists valid reasons for supporting the Weltpolitik, and
explains why support for the Weltpolitik came from certain quarters, the
importance of the Reich?s leadership cannot be forgotten.? Miquel bought the Junkers for the Reich with
inflated grain prices.? The support of
the Junkers was thus tied to the Reich, and they were once more within the
Reich.? The Junkers did not demand the
higher prices, they were pre-empted and bought off with them.? Miquel?s financial policy, culminating in
the tariffs of 1902 remelded the old right and the Reich, whilst Tirpitz?s
building programme equally bought off the navy.? The navy, entirely useless either for defending colonies (as
their cruising range was sufficient only for use in the North Sea) or blockade
breaking, was purely a weapon of offence that could only be trained on Britain,
and so although I would accept that agrarian protection and a great navy were
two sides of a single bargain, in their inherent economic benefits and social
boons (such as the transformation of Marxist revolutionaries into modern trade
unions by the simple property of affluence). Kehr, whose suggestion for his own
epitaph was ?Yes, he was a Red, but he was a Man too?, forgets the role of the
new, moderate SPD in the growing anxiety in Europe.? The SPD?s doctrine of striking in the event of war led many to
believe that Germany would not be allowed to start a war of aggression and so
the only war that could be prepare for would be a war of self defence against
the unsocialist nations of Europe.?
Thus, Germany which was ?practically a Socialist country? had to strive
to win any victories possible in order to successfully export Socialism
abroad.? I believe that
A.J. P. Taylor?s assertion that Germany was too ?intoxicated? by their own
power to accept alliances to be too vague and I would not accept Kehr?s
argument of class interest, but instead look to England to discover? a marked lack of interest.? Salisbury certainly never showed any great
interest in any alliances with Germany and, so we must question whether the
English overtures to Germany were never intended to do more than to allow
England to seize any moral high ground.