Ww2 Propaganda Essay, Research Paper
Needless to say, every one of the wars just mentioned was advertised as a defensive, moralistic, and completely national expedition. Bismarck even went so far as to make an unworkable treaty with Austria so that he could claim, when Austria broke it, that he was waging war in defense of the sacredness of treaties. But no one should be deceived by such propaganda. All these wars were waged in order to maintain certain groups in control in the belligerent countries.
The third class of wars are those waged to turn attention from unsatisfactory conditions at home. Bismarck made three wars primarily in order to break the bourgeois ranks and overcome particularism in Germany. Napoleon III’s expedition to Mexico was merely an effort to please the discontented Catholics at home. Last Spring there were indications that the American government was considering seriously the idea of a war with Japan in order to bring us out of the Depression. If the Five-Year Plan fails in Russia, and disorders break out there similar to the disorders in France in the four months preceding the declaration of war in 1792, we may expect the Russian government to try its hand at a war in order to turn attention from its failure. For this is a natural means of strengthening the hands of a government, of uniting the nation and thus preserving power. It works if you win.
But the three types of motive so far considered are not nearly so frequently encountered as the fourth type, the making of war to strengthen and enrich dominating group. Once such a group is firmly in the saddle it always uses the opportunity to further strengthen its own economic and political power. In this class of wars we include all the colonial wars of modern times, the British (opium) war of 1840, thc Boer War, the Franco-British intervention in the Crimean War, Napoleon III’s war on Austria in 1859, Russia’s numerous wars on Turkey,.the Russo-Japanese War, and our own war on Mexico. Each of thc governments which forced these vvars was pushed on by groups at home so powerful that they could dictate its policy. The Boer War is a perfect example of a class dominating foreign policy and making war to fill its own pocketbook.
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Thc World War furnishes examples of all these different types of motivation. The military clique in Serbia striving to get into control, the governing Germans and Magyars in Austria-Hungary fearing to lose control, the dominating manufacturers, bankers and landowners in the other countries hoping to increase their wealth by destroying dangerous competition–such were the internal forces that, in 1914, produced war. Out of the interests of the dominating classes in the principal countries of Europe arose the foreign policies and alliances that led to the war.
Take first the antagonism between Austria-Hungary and Russia. In the Austro-Hungarian monarchy one finds that the dominant Germans and Magyars were afraid of losing control at home if the various subordinate nationalities grew too strong. As most of these were Slavic, the creation of large Slavic states in the Balkins would draw the Southern Slavs from Austria-Hungary and induce the Northern Slavs and Rumanians to demand more power or even independence. If Russia destroyed the Ottoman Empire, took Constantinople and created large Slavic states in the Balkans, the Austro-Hungarian monarchy would go to pieces. Naturally, the dominating groups, particularly the Hungarun nobles, hated and feared Russia and turned to Gcrmany for support against her.
As for Russia and her ambitions in the Near East, back of her colossal capacity for expansion lay the interests of a dominant landowning class faced with the alternative of either internal reforms weakening to its power or else expansion. In the Near East the interests of landowners desiring to export their grain and of textile manufacturers wishing to control the markets of Asia produced numerous wars on Turkey. Of course, the Russian government maintained piously that it was trying to free the Balkan Slavs from the oppression of the un-Christian Turks, and one of the chief articles in the programme of Pan-Slavism was the release of the Greek Orthodox Slavs from Roman Catholic oppression in Austria-Hungary. But this propaganda should deceive no one. The interests of the landowners and textile manufacturers provided the whole driving force for Russian expansion in the Near East, and as a result, for Russian antagonism to Austria-Hungary.
In the Russo-German feud, the conflict started with thc building of railroads in Russia that could transport grain cheaply into the German market. Germany, in alarm, raised her tariff on grain, and Russia retaliated with various bellicose measures, including a heavy tariff on manu?actures, and a transfer of her loans from Berlin to Paris, This procedure antagonized the German bankers, manufacturers and large landowners–the dominating classes in Germany. The Russians were alarmed too by the growth of German commerce in the Near East and angered by the German support of Austria-Hungary. For all thcse reasons, the famous break between Germany and Russia, which happened to come in 1890, was inevitable. Tbe dominating classes in the two countries had too many conflicting interests; not even their common, but rather general interest in thc conservative principle could prevail over their other disagreements.
As between Germany and Great Britain, the conflict for the markets of the world was alone sufficient to engender hostility. British consuls began complaining of German competition in the 80’s, and after 1900 this competition became so serious that British manufacturers had to lower wages, and strikes and other troubles resulted. Efforts to bring about a compromise between the German and British manufacturers failed because both wanted to sell everything everywhere. The British talked grandly o? the German desire for world hegemony, but they meant only the German effort to dominate the world’s markets. The British also talked of the menace of the German fleet, but in reality it was never large enough to threaten seriously Britain’s control of the seas. And the Germans, on their side, talked of the insult to German national honor whenever the British excluded them from Morocco, or Persia or some other profitable market.
Finally, we come to the Franco-German antagonism. This is older than any of the others and an understanding of it is made difficult by the enormous literature that befogs the subject. Yet it is clear that France, like Great Britain, was controlled by her bankers and manufacturers. These classes found it easier to dominate the deputies in a democratic republic than the king in a monarchy. But the republicans had got off to a bad start in 1870-71 when they lost the war; to them Alsace-Lorraine was the symbol af their defeat. Until they seem to realize that foreign offices are subject to the same influences. In this country our State Department lately indulged in a classic example of servility to a dbminant group. It found out that several South American countries were in such a precarious position that investments there were unsafe. It sent the news to Wall Street and asked it not to lend any money to these states. When Wall Street, despite this warning, continued to float more bonds which the State Department knew were likely to injure our investors it should have informed the investing public of the facts. But instead, it kept quiet and let American investors lose their money.
But tbough it is an indisputable fact that governments always act, whether in peace or in war, in accordance with thc intercsts of the dominant economic and socia1 groups, this does not mean that they can afford to neglect the pretense of protecting the interests of other groups. Louis Philippe lost his throne because he made no effort to persuade the classes other than the manufacturers and bankers that he was working for them. The French lawyers who run the Third Republic know better than this; they keep up a constant chatter about their radicaI reforms for the benefit of the workers and peasants. Yet all their measures show who their real masters are.
Nor can it be argued that the theory of dominating groups controlling foreign policy is made invalid by thc fact that diplomats as a class betray some of the most naive intellects in the governmental circle. Their chief function, in fact, is simply to exercise a peasant-like cleverness in cheating other diplomats. They do what they do with a sincere belief in their own propaganda, and without realizing who it is that is kicking them about.
Finally, no one can object to the theory of dominant groups on account of the fact that such groups are often very shortsighted in the matter of their real interests. It is true that they are often shortsighted; but what they conceive to be their interest is what they force the government to do. That this interest is not often that of the whole country is another matter, –and something that the late Norman Angill, in “The Great Illusion”, failed to understand. .
If it be true, then, that dominating groups control foreign policy and make wars to maintain their dominance, what chance is there that these groups can be persuaded to avoid war by giving up their control? The answer is, practically none.
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