Gay Dennis Essay, Research Paper
More About The 1968 Tet Offensive
For several thousand years, Vietnamese Lunar New Year has been a
traditional celebration that brings the Vietnamese a sense of
happiness, hope and peace. However, in recent years, It also
bring back a bitter memory full of tears. It reminds them the
1968 bloodshed, a bloodiest military campaign of the Vietnam War
the North Communists launched against the South.
The “general offensive and general uprising” of the north marked
the sharp turn of the Vietnam War. Today there have been a great
number of writings about this event. However, it seems that many
key facts in the Communist campaign are still misinterpreted or
neglected.
In the mid-80, living in Saigon after being released from the
Communist “re-education camp,” I read a book published in the
early 1980’s in America about the story of the 1968 Tet
Offensive. It said that the North Vietnamese Army supreme command
had imitated one of the greatest heroes of Vietnam, King Quang
Trung, who won the most spectacular victory over the Chinese
aggressors in the 1789 counter-attack – in planning the 1968
operations.
The book quoted King Quang Trung’s tactic of surprise. He let the
troops celebrate the 1789 Tet Festival one day ahead so that he
could launch the attacks on the first three days of the lunar new
year while the Chinese troops were still feasting and not ready
to organize their defense.
Those who claimed the similarity between the two campaigns
certainly did not know the whole truth, but jumped into
conclusion with wild imagination after learning that the North
Vietnamese attacking units also celebrated Tet “one day ahead”
before the attacks.
In fact, the Tet Offensive broke out on the Tet’s Eve – in the
early morning of January 30, 1968 at many cities of Central
Vietnam, such as Da Nang and Qui Nhon, as well as cities in the
central coastal and highland areas, that lied within the
Communist 5th Military Region.. The other cities to the south
that included Saigon, were attacked 24 hours later at the small
hours of January 31. Thus the offensive lost its element of total
surprise that every tactician has to respect.
But It surprised me that some in the American media were still
The story started some 5 months previously. On August 8, 1967,
the North Vietnam government approved a lunar calendar
specifically compiled for the 7th time zone that covers all
Vietnam, replacing the traditional lunar calendar that had been
in use in Asia for hundreds of years.
That old calendar was calculated for the 8th time zone that
Beijing falls right in the middle. It was accepted in general by
a few nations such as China, Vietnam, Taiwan, Hong Kong and
somewhat in Japan and Korea, mostly for traditional celebrations
and religious purposes. South Vietnam used this calendar. With
common cultural origin, these countries needed not have their own
calendar, particularly it has not been used for scientific and
administrative activities.
The North Vietnam new lunar calendar differs from the common
calendar about some dates, such as the leap months of certain
year (1984 and 1987) and the Tet’s Eve of the three Lunar New
Years: Mau Than (1968), Ky Dau (1969) and At Suu (1985). South
Vietnam celebrated the first day of the Mau Than lunar year on
January 30, 1968, while North Vietnam celebrated it on Jan 29,
1968.
It was obviously that the North Vietnamese leaders had ordered
the offensives to be launched on the night of the first day of
Tet to take the objectives by total surprise. By some reason, the
North Vietnamese Army Supreme Command was not aware of the fact
that there were different dates for Tet between North and South
Vietnam. Therefore, most NVA units in the Communist 5th Military
Region – closer to North Vietnam – probably used North Vietnamese
calendar, and conducted their attacks in the night between Jan 29
and 30, while their comrades farther to the south attacked in the
night from Jan 30 to 31.
Many in the intelligence branch of the South Vietnamese Armed
Forces were well aware of the reason why the Communist forces
launched their attacks at two different dates. Information from
sources among NVA prisoners of war and ralliers about the new
calendar of North Vietnam should have been neglected by the
American side. The information was also available in broadcast
from Hanoi Radio.
In military operations, nothing is more important than surprise.
So the Communist forces lost their advantage of surprise on more
than half of the objectives. Had the Vietnamese Communists
conducted their coordinated attacks at the same H-hour, South
Vietnam would have been in much more troubles.
The large scale offensive resulted in drastic human and morale
losses of the Communist forces. However, the offensive caused an
extreme negative effect in the American public opinion and
boosted the more bitter protests against the war.
Until lately, the Ha Noi propaganda and political indoctrination
system has always claimed the Tet offensive their military
victory, and never insisted on their victory over the morale of
the American public.. Obviously, Ha Noi leaders won a priceless
victory at an unintended objective.
In South Vietnam, on the contrary, the offensive created an
unexpected attitude among the people.
After the first few hours of panic, the South Vietnamese armed
forces reacted fiercely. There were hundreds of stories of brave
soldiers and small units who fought their enemies with incredible
courage..
A large number of those who were playing fence-sitters especially
in the region around Hue City then took side with the nationalist
government.
Several mass graves were found where thousands unarmed soldiers,
civil servants and civilians were shot, stabbed, or with skulls
mashed by clubs and buried in strings of ropes, even buried
alive. A large number of VC-sympathizers who saw the horrible
graves, undeniable evidence of the Communist barbarian crimes,
changed side.
The most significant indication of such attitude could be
observed from the figures of young volunteers. to join the army.
After the first wave of Communist attacks, a great number of
youth under draft age – below 20 years old – voluntarily enrolled
in the army for combat units, so high that thousands of young
draftees were delayed reporting for boot camps.
On the Communist side, the number of ralliers known as “chieu
hoi” increased about four times. The offensive planners
apparently expected the so-called “people upraising,” so most
secret cells were ordered to emerge. When the attacking units
were crushed, cell members had to flee to the green
forests. Thus the Tet offensive helped South Vietnam neutralize
much of the Communist infrastructure before the Phoenix Campaign
got rid of many others.
Unfortunately, such achievements were nullified by the waves of
protests in America. As in any other developing countries, nobody
takes heed of a speech from a Vietnamese official. But the same
thing from an American statesman or even a protester could be
well listened to and trusted. So information from the Western
media produced rumors that the USA was about to sell off South
Vietnam to the Communist blocks.
The rumors were almost absolutely credible to the Vietnamese -
particularly the military servicemen of all ranks – because of
another hearsay that until now have a very powerful impact on the
mind of a great number of the South Vietnamese. There have been
no poll on the subject, but it was estimated that more than half
of the soldiers strongly believed that “it was the Americans who
helped the Communist attack the South Vietnamese cities.”
Hundreds of officers from all over South Vietnam asserted that
they “saw” NVA soldiers moving into the cities on US Army trucks,
or American helicopters transporting supplies to NVA units. In
Saigon, most people accepted the allegation that the Americans
deliberately let the Communists infiltrate the capital city
because the American electronic sensor defense system around
Saigon was able to detect things as small as a mouse crossing the
hi-tech fences.
Another hearsay among the South Vietnamese military ran that
“none of the American military units or installation and agencies
- military or civilian – was under Communist first phase of the
offensive (February) except for the US Embassy. And only after
nearly three weeks did the US Marines engaged in the battle of
Hue, in the old Royal Palace” The allegation seemed to be true.
The American combat units, however, were fighting fierce battles
in phase 2 (May 1968) and phase 3 (September 1968).
Similar rumors might have been of no importance if they were in
America.But in Vietnam, they did convince a lot of people. In the
military, they dealt deadly blows on the soldiers’ morale. Their
impacts still lingered on until the last days of April 1975.
The truth in the rumors did not matter much. But the fact that a
great numbers of the fighting men strongly believed the rumors
turned them into a deadly psychological weapon which very few or
maybe none has ever properly treated in writU.S Involvement in the Vietnam War
“No new taxes.” This is a quote that most all of us
remember from the 1992 presidential election. Along with it we
remember that there were new taxes during that presidents term in
office. There are a myriad of promises made and things done in a
presidential election year that have questionable motives as to
whether they are done in the best interest of the people or in
the interests of the presidential candidate. These hidden
interests are one of the biggest problems with the political
aspects of government in modern society. One of the prime
examples of this is the Vietnam War. Although South Vietnam
asked for our help, which we had previously promised, the entire
conflict was managed in order to meet personal political agendas
and to remain politically correct in the world’s eyes rather than
to bring a quick and decisive end to the conflict. This can be
seen in the selective bombing of Hanoi throughout the course of
the Vietnam War. Politically this strategy looked very good.
However, militarily it was ludicrous. War is the one arena in
which politicians have no place. War is the military’s sole
purpose. Therefore, the U. S. Military should be allowed to
conduct any war, conflict, or police action that it has been
committed to without political interference or control because of
the problems and hidden interests which are always present when
dealing with polit
United States involvement in the Vietnam War actually
began in 1950 when the U. S. began to subsidize the French Army
in South Vietnam. This involvement continued to escalate
throughout the 1950’s and into the early 1960’s. On August 4,
1964 the Gulf of Tonkin incident occurred in which American Naval
Vessels in South Vietnamese waters were fired upon by North
Vietnam. On August 5, 1964 President Johnson requested a
resolution expressing the determination of the United Sates in
supporting freedom and in protecting peace in southeast Asia (
Johnson ). On August 7, 1964, in response to the presidential
request, Congress authorized President Johnson to take all
necessary measures to repel any attack and to prevent aggression
against the U. S. in southeast Asia ( United States ). The
selective bombing of North Vietnam began immediately in response
to this resolution. In March of the following year U. S. troops
began to arrive.
Although the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution specifically
stated that we had no military, political, or territorial
ambitions in southeast Asia, the interests back home were quite
a different story ( Johnson ). The political involvement in
Vietnam was about much more than just promised aid to a weak
country in order to prevent the spread of communism. It was
about money. After all, wars require equipment, guns, tools and
machinery. Most of which was produced in the United States. It
was about proving America’s commitment to stop communism. Or
rather to confine communism in its present boundaries But most
of all it was about politics. The presidential political
involvement in Vietnam had little to do with Vietnam at all. It
was about China for Eisenhower, about Russia for Kennedy, about
Washington D.C. for Johnson, and about himself for Nixon ( Post
). The last two of which were the major players in America’s
involvement in regards to U. S. Troops being used ( Wittman ).
The military involvement in Vietnam is directly related
to the political management of the military throughout the war.
The military controlled by the politicians. The micro
management of the military by the White House for political gain
is the primary reason for both the length and cost, both monetary
and human, of the Vietnam War ( Pelland ). One of the largest
problems was the lack of a clear objective in the war and the
support to accomplish it. The predominant military opinion of
the military’s role in Vietnam in respect to the political
involvement is seen in the following quote by General Colin
Powell, “If you’re going to put into something then you owe the
armed forces, you owe the American People, you owe just you’re
own desire to succeed, a clear statement of what political
objective you’re trying to achieve and then you put the
sufficient force to that objective so that you know when you’ve
accomplished it.” The politicians dictated the war in Vietnam,
it was a limited war, the military was never allowed to fight the
war in the manner that they thought that they needed to in order
to win it ( Baker ).
To conclude on the Vietnam War, the political management
of the war made it unwinnable. The military was at the mercy of
politicians who knew very little about what needed to be done
militarily in order to win the war. There is an enormous
difference between political judgment and military judgment.
This difference is the primary reason for the outcome of the
Vietnam War ( Schwarzkopf ).
The Gulf War in the Middle East was almost the exact
opposite in respect to the political influence on the war. In
respect to the military objective of the war the two are
relatively similar. The objective was to liberate a weaker
country from their aggressor. The United Nation’s resolution was
explicit in its wording regarding military force in the Persian
Gulf. The resolution specifically stated “by all means
necessary.”( Schwarzkopf ).
The President was very aware of the problems with
political management of warfare throughout the war. He was very
determined to let the military call the shots about how the war
was conducted. He made a specific effort to prevent the
suggestion that civilians were going to try to run the war (
Baker ). Painful lessons had been learned in the Vietnam War,
which was still fresh on the minds of many of those involved in
this war ( Baker ).
The military was given full control to use force as they
saw fit. Many of the top military leaders had also been involved
in the Vietnam War. These men exhibited a very strong never
again attitude throughout the planning stages of this war.
General Schwarzkopf made the following statement about the
proposed bombing of Iraq in regards to the limited bombing in
Vietnam, “I had no doubt we would bomb Iraq if I was going to be
the Military Commander.” He went on to say that it would be
absolutely stupid to go into a military campaign against his,
Iraq’s, forces who had a tremendous advantage on us on the
ground, numbers wise. It would be ludicrous not to fight the
war in the air as much, if not more, than on the ground (
Schwarzkopf ).
The result of the Gulf War in which the military was
given control, as we know, was a quick, decisive victory. There
were many other factors involved in this than just the military
being given control, particularly in contrast to Vietnam, but the
military having control played a major part in this victory.
In conclusion, although there are some major differences
between the two conflicts one fact can be seen very clearly.
That is the fact that the military is best suited for conducting
wars. Politicians are not. It is not the place of a politicians
to be involved in the decision making process in regards to war
or military strategy. The White House has significant control in
military matters. That control should be used to help the
military in achieving its goals as it was in the Gulf War where
George Bush said specifically to let the military do its job.
The only alternative to this is to use political influence in the
ege Station. 9-10 Jan. 1996.
“Interview with Secretary of State, James Baker.” Frontline WGBH
Educational Foundation. PBS, College Station. 9-10 Jan. 1996.
Johnson, Lyndon B. “The Tonkin Gulf Incident.” Message to
Congress. Aug. 5, 1964. Department of State Bulletin 24 Aug.
1964: n.p.
Leyden, Andrew P. “The Operation Desert Storm Debriefing Book”
Internet Page. University of Notre Dame Law School. 15 Feb.
1995.
Pelland, Paul. E-mail to the author. 25 June 1996.
Post, James N. E-mail to the author. 26 June 1996
Roush, Gary. Statistics about the Vietnam War Internet Page.
Nov. 1993.
United States, Joint Resolution of Congress H. J. RES 1145.
Aug. 7, 1964. Department of State Bulletin 24 Aug. 1965.
Wittman, Sandra M. “Chronology of the Vietnam War.” Vietnam:
Yesterday and Today Oakton Community College. Skokie, Illinois.
16 May 1996: n.p.ings about the
Vietnam War. Most authors studied the war at high echelons, but
neglected the morale of the buck privates and the effect of the
media in the Vietnam War. No military plan even by top
strategists in the White House could succeed if half of the
privates believed that they would be defeated before long. So why
should they go on fighting?
For years, I have been wondering how much the American public was
uninformed about the Vietnam War.
From “My War” (unpublished) by L.T.
Bibliography
Johnson, Lyndon B. “The Tonkin Gulf Incident.” Message to
Congress. Aug. 5, 1964. Department of State Bulletin 24 Aug.
1964: n.p.
Leyden, Andrew P. “The Operation Desert Storm Debriefing Book”
Internet Page. University of Notre Dame Law School. 15 Feb.
1995.
Pelland, Paul. E-mail to the author. 25 June 1996.
Post, James N. E-mail to the author. 26 June 1996
Roush, Gary. Statistics about the Vietnam War Internet Page.
Nov. 1993.
United States, Joint Resolution of Congress H. J. RES 1145.
Aug. 7, 1964. Department of State Bulletin 24 Aug. 1965.
Wittman, Sandra M. “Chronology of the Vietnam War.” Vietnam:
Yesterday and Today Oakton Community College. Skokie, Illinois.
16 May 1996: n.p.ings about the
Vietnam War. Most authors studied the war at high echelons, but
neglected the morale of the buck privates and the effect of the
media in the Vietnam War. No military plan even by top
strategists in the White House could succeed if half of the
privates believed that they would be defeated before long. So why
should they go on fighting?
For years, I have been wondering how much the American public was
uninformed about the Vietnam War.
From “My War” (unpublished) by L.T.