Egoism Ethics

скачати

Egoism Ethics Essay, Research Paper

In ethics egoism entails that the individual self is either the motivating moral

force and is, or should, be the end of moral action. Egoism divides into both a

positive and normative ethic. The positive ethic views egoism as a factual

description of human affairs, that is people are motivated by their own

interests and desires. The normative ethic is that they should be so motivated.

Positivist egoism: Psychological Egoism The positivist egoist, whose theory is

called psychological egoism, offers an explanation of human affairs, in effect a

description of human nature, which he or she believes to be wholly self-centred

and self-motivated. In its strong form the theory asserts that people always act

in their own interests, even though they may disguise their motivation with

references to helping others or doing their duty. Opponents exploit

counter-factual evidence to criticize the theory-surely, they claim, there is a

host of evidence supporting altruistic or duty-bound actions that cannot be said

to engage the self-interest of the agent? Psychological egoists may then attempt

to question the ultimate motive of acting benevolently towards others; they may

retort that seemingly altruistic behavior necessarily has a self-interested

component, that if the individual were not to offer aid to a stranger, he or she

may feel guilty or may look bad in front of a peer group. At this point

psychological egoism’s validity turns on the question of moral motivation. But

since motivation is inherently private (an agent could be lying to him or

herself or to others about the original motive), the theory shifts from a

theoretical description of human nature, one that can be put to observational

testing, to an assumption about human nature. It moves beyond the possibility of

empirical verification and the possibility of empirical negation (since motives

are private), and therefore it becomes a closed theory. A closed theory is a

theory that rejects competing theories on its own terms and is non-verifiable

and non-falsifiable. If psychological egoism is reduced to an assumption

concerning human nature, then it follows that it is just as valid to hold a

competing theory of human motivation, psychological altruism for example.

Psychological altruism holds that all human action is necessarily other centred

and other motivated. A parallel analysis of psychological altruism results in

opposing conclusions to psychological egoism, and again arguably the theory is

just as closed as psychological egoism. If both theories can be validly

maintained, it follows that the soundness of either or both must be questioned.

A weak version of psychological egoism accepts the possibility of altruistic or

benevolent behavior, but maintains that whenever a choice is made it is by

definition the action that the agent wants to do at that point. A wants to help

the poor, therefore A is acting egoistically; if A ran into a burning building

to save a kitten, it must be the case that A wanted to save the kitten. Defining

all motivations as what the agent wants to do remains problematic: logically the

theory becomes tautologous and therefore empty of providing a useful,

descriptive meaning of motivation. It says that we are motivated to do what we

are motivated to do. Besides which, if helping others is what A wants to do,

then to what extent can A be continued to be called an egoist? David Hume in his

Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (Appendix II-Of Self Love) offers

six rebuttals of psychological egoism (the ’selfish hypothesis’). Firstly, it

opposes such obvious moral sentiments that engage in a concern and motivation

for others such as love, friendship, compassion, and gratitude. Secondly,

psychological egoism attempts to reduce human motivation to a single cause,

which is a ‘fruitless’ task-the "love of simplicity?has been the source

of much false reasoning in philosophy." Thirdly, it is evident that animals

act benevolently towards one another, and if it is admitted that animals can act

altruistically then how can it be denied in humans? Fourthly, the concepts we

use to describe benevolent behavior cannot be meaningless; sometimes the agent

obviously does not have a personal interest in the fortune of another, yet will

wish him well. Any attempt to create an imaginary interest, as the psychological

egoist attempts, will prove futile. Fifthly, Hume asserts that we have prior

motivations to self-interest; we may have, for example, a predisposition towards

vanity, fame, or vengeance that transcends any benefit to the agent. Finally,

even if psychological egoism were true, there are a sufficient number of

dispositions to generate a wide possibility of moral actions, allowing one

person to be called vicious and another humane, and the latter is to be

preferred over the former. Normative Egoism: Ethical Egoism Ethical egoism is

the theory that the promotion of one’s own good is in accordance with morality.

In the strong version it is held that it is always moral to promote one’s own

good and it is never moral not to promote it. In the weak version, it claims

that whilst it is always moral to promote one’s good, it is not necessarily

never moral not to do so-that is, there may be conditions in which the avoidance

of personal interest may be a moral action. In the imaginary construction of a

world inhabited by a single being, it is possible that the pursuit of morality

is the same as the pursuit of self-interest. What is good for the agent is the

same as what is in the agent’s interests. Arguably, there could never arise an

occasion when the agent ought not to pursue self-interest in favor of another

morality. Whilst it is possible for the creature to lament previous choices as

not conducive to self-interest (enjoying the pleasures of swimming all day and

not spending necessary time producing food), the mistake is not a moral mistake

but a mistake of identifying self-interest. Presumably this lonely creature will

begin to comprehend the distinctions between short and long run interests.

However, it can be countered that in this world duties still apply; (Kantian)

duties are those actions reason dictates ought to be pursued regardless of any

gain or loss to the self or others. The deontologist asserts another moral

sphere, namely impartial duties, which ought to be pursued. The problem with

complicating the creature’s world with duties, is defining an impartial task in

a purely subjective world. Impartiality, it can be retorted, can only exist

where there are competing selves, otherwise the attempt to be impartial in

judging one’s actions is a redundant exercise. If we move away from the

imaginary construct of a single being’s world, ethical egoism comes under fire

from more pertinent arguments. In complying with ethical egoism, the individual

aims at his or her own greatest good. Ignoring a definition of the good for the

present, it may justly be argued that pursuing one’s own greatest good can

conflict with another’s pursuit, thus creating a situation of conflict. In a

typical example, a young person may see his greatest good in murdering his rich

uncle to inherit his millions. It is the rich uncle’s greatest good to continue

enjoying his money, as he sees fit. Accordingly conflict is an inherent problem

of ethical egoism, and the model seemingly does not possess a conflict

resolution system. With the additional premise of living in society, ethical

egoism has much to respond to. Obviously there are situations when two people’s

greatest goods, their own self-interests, will conflict, and a solution to such

dilemmas is a necessary element of any theory attempting to provide an ethical

system. The first resolution proceeds from a state of nature examination. If, in

the wilderness, two people simultaneously come across the only source of

drinkable water a dilemma arises if both make a claim to it. With no recourse to

arbitration they must either accept an equal share of the water, which would

comply with rational egoism (i.e., it is in the interests of both to share, for

both may enjoy the water and each other’s company, and if the water is

inexhaustible, neither can gain from monopolising the source), but a critic can

maintain that it is not necessarily in compliance with ethical egoism. Arguably,

the critic continues, the two have no possible resolution and must therefore

fight for the water. This is often the line taken against egoism, that it

results in insoluble conflict that implies or necessitates a resort to force.

The proffered resolution is therefore an acceptance of the might is right

principle, that the stronger will take possession and thereby gains proprietary

rights. But ethical egoism does not have to logically result in a Darwinian

struggle between the strong and the weak; the two could co-operate (as rational

egoism would require) and thereby both could mutually benefit. Against the

critic’s pessimism, the ethical egoist can retort that each can recognize that

their greatest interests are served more through co-operation than conflict. A

second resolution to seemingly intractably moral dilemmas concerns the fears of

critics that ethical egoists could logically pursue their interests at the cost

of others. This however is a misreading of ethical egoism and an attempt to

re-insert the might is right premise and thereby chastise the theory on the

basis of a straw-man argument. In the case of the rich uncle and the greedy

nephew, it is not the case that the nephew would act ethically by killing his

uncle. The confusion results from conflating ethics with personal gain and

criticising personal gain from another ethical standpoint that condemns murder.

A counter-argument is that personal gain logically cannot be in one’s best

interests if it entails doing harm to another: doing harm to another is to

accept the principle of doing harm to others as being ethical (i.e., equating to

one’s own best interests), whereas reflection on the principle shows it to be

illogical on universalist criteria. If the nephew were to attempt to do harm to

further his interests, he would find that his uncle, or others, would do harm in

return, and the argument returns to the conclusion of the first resolution:

either accept the principle of might is right (which in most cases would be

evidentially contrary to one’s best interests) or accept that co-operation with

others is a more successful approach to improving one’s interests. A third

resolution entails the insertion of another standard-rights. This incorporates

the conclusions of the first two resolutions by stating that there is an ethical

framework that can logically be extrapolated from ethical egoism. Rights

incorporate boundaries to behavior that reason or experience has shown to be

contrary to the pursuit of self-interest. However, the logical extrapolation is

the difficult bit. Whilst it is facile to argue that the greedy nephew does not

have a right to claim his uncle’s money, because it is not his but his uncle’s,

and that it is wrong to aggress against the person of another because that

person has a legitimate right to live in peace (thus providing the substance of

conflict-resolution for ethical egoism), the problem lies in the intellectual

arguments required to substantiate the claims for the existence of rights and

that they are somehow intricately connected to the pursuit of individual’s

greatest good.

Додати в блог або на сайт

Цей текст може містити помилки.

A Free essays | Essay
16.8кб. | download | скачати


Related works:
Egoism
Ethical Egoism
The Egoism Of Max Stirner
ETHICAL EGOISM
Ethical Egoism
Ethical Egoism
Psychological Egoism
Is Moral Egoism Correct
Egoism Utilitarianism And Respect
© Усі права захищені
написати до нас