The Role Of Decision Making In The Pre-Crisis Period Of India (15 March, 1959 – 7
September, 1962) Essay, Research Paper
The Role of Decision Making in the Pre-Crisis Period of India (15 March, 1959 – 7
September, 1962)
Boyko Iaramov
Introduction to International Relations
Professor Bond
More than thirty years have passed since the dramatic cling of arm in
the remote Himalayan region of the Sino-Indian border. This Time gap seems to be
appropriate for a correct reexamination of the conflict. The account of India’s
attempt to find balance with China, ever since the Kongska Pass incident in 1959
until the attack of 1962, is not merely a fact sheet that we can brows and toss
and toss away. In stead we have to link each idea to the event and causes that
might have played a role in the conflict.
Ever since 1959 the border problem between Asia’s biggest two nation-
states has been picking up speed at a threatening speed. The year 1962 was the
unfortunate year for India which knocked out any possibility of understanding
between China and India. Of course, such an act of terror could have not started
without some kind of the reason, whatever it may be. The chronological order of
pre-crisis decisions taken India’s authorities are of great importance.
The role of the decision-makers before the time of the armed conflict
had a big significance for India’s position on political and economic matters in
the continent of Asia. A major figure in India’s decision making was Jawaharlal
Nehru, leader of the Congress Party, head of the Planning Commission and chief
spokesman of the government in Parliament. These titles not only made him an
important nationalistic figure but also Gandhi’s appointed heir and a “major
architect of India’s political institutions” (Brecher, 1959). Krishna Menon,
“the controversial defense minister consulted in almost every issue” along with
Pandit Govind Ballabh Pant was also a figure of great importance (Langyel, 1962).
This importance was mainly derived from the fact that both shared the same
overall world view of Nehru. However, in order to understand the cruicial
importance of decision-makers, we shall looked seperately at each of India’s top
men.
Menon was highly important and useful to Nehru in the essence that the
latter helped Nehru convey his thought and policies to the outside world in a
forceful and organized manner (Brecher, 1959). But as Rajani Palme Dutt said in
his book “The problem of India,” foreign policy was exercised “more behind the
scenes than in meetings of the committee.” Both Menon and Nehru acted to the
desire of Nehru. It was often when the Foreign secretary would take to Pant
drafts of diplomatic correspondence and get the reaction which was usually at
Nehru’s request (Hoffmann,1990).
Foreign policy makers Nehru, Menon and Pant shared a common world view
which clearly showed their psychological predisposition, drawn from the sources
of their personality, idiosyncrasy, ideology, tradition, culture and history. As
we shall see further down, in the mainstream of common ideas and beliefs, they
indeed had some differences. But all these men used the “attitudinal prism”
(Hoffmann, 1990), the lens through which they filtered and structured the
information thus perceiving the world. One set of Indian beliefs referred to the
role India should play world. This role was supposed to reflect the fact that
India was a considerably new nation-state.
India also had to preserve her independence of action. It didn’t simply
fight for independence simply to become a camp follower of any of the Cold War
Power blocs. The restrictions and limitations that such a position imply would
be against India’s national interest. And it was exactly this nonalignment
policy of Nehru between the two sides of the Cold War which was the projection
of Indian nationalism into world affairs (Maxwell, 1970). Nehru also expressed
the idea that India was an Asian power that should not be overlooked at. He
demonstrated that “in regard to any major problem of a country or a group of
countries of Asia, India has to be considered” (Gopal, 1980).
During the 1950’s and 1960’s Nehru and his advisors realized that India
was playing a far more than neutral role in the Cold War politics. She was a
very important player on the world stage, where questions of war and peace were
decided. He recognized that in s bipolar world, in which relations between the
superpowers were based mainly on “balance-of-power calculations” (Hoffmann,
1990), a nuclear holocaust, for example, had become highly likely. He sought
that India should stay out of the superpowers’ way in the nuclear arms race and
at the same time work to the reduction of superpower confrontation by “fostering
communication, engaging in constructive diplomacy and public judging each action
of the United States and the former Soviet Union on its merits” (Brecher, 1959).
Nehru strongly believed that this trend will only act to the good of India, for
it was “economic development that was the countries primary goal” (Hoffmann,
1990). So the act of nonalignment was an act of peace and not hostility. A
nonalignment trend will also allow India to receive development aid from “as
many countries as could be persuaded to contribute” (Hoffmann, 1990), whatever
their Cold War leanings. India’s prime minister was well aware that at the
present state the country could not spent considerable amount of resources for a
large defense establishment. An India aligned with no Cold War Power bloc would
help avoid alienating nations like former Soviet Union and China, which were of
great importance to India’s security. Nehru himself realized that a hostile
frontier with China, for example, would mean an expenditure of all Indian
resources just to defend it (Gopal, 1980).
Another standard belief that Nehru and the rest of his associates
developed in India’s foreign policy affairs was the so called image making
(Hoffmann, 1990). Nehru developed the complex “images” of nations, governments,
international trends and situations. Of course, as later will be shown, they
were subject to change, but not that easily. So in the way of image making,
Nehru had made it a fundamental view of Indian foreign policy to treat former
Soviet Union and China as separate powers, passing two different sets of
problems. So, right now, there was no reason for him not to forge the
friendliest possible relationship with former Soviet Union.
The image that Nehru set for the United States was one of more
persistent work. The anti-communism phobia that was shaking the United States at
the time, made it very hard for Indian authority to set its right relations with
the U.S. But still, according to Nehru, relations could be kept constructive and
could be improved once the U.S. overcame their suspicion of nonalignment.
Another reason for the obstruction of Indo-American relations was the U.S.
policy toward arming Pakistan military, thereby threatening India military.
As the result of this momentous post independence decision of India’s
authority, once again primarily Nehru and Krishna Menon, the country had
accepted membership in the remains of the British Empire – the Commonwealth
(Hoffmann, 1990). This important tie assured India, that despite of nonalignment
it would never be completely isolated. It would be granted communication with
the West and other Third World countries, members once again in the Commonwealth,
and as a result Indian diplomatic influence would be enhanced. It was both the
importance of a continued British supply of military equipment and the
possibility of trade and economic assistance that made this membership so
valuable.
China, however, was the biggest element of concern. Nehru never had the
element of doubt that China’s position in the communist world will constitute a
problem to India (Gopal, 1980). His largeness of mind led him to the hope that
the tradition of nearly two thousand years of peace could continue in an era of
Indian and Chinese national reassertion. He was determined to prevent the
former Soviet Union and China from combining powers against India. But he also
knew that the Chinese as well as the Russians were acting on the strength of
their own national foreign policy interests and imperatives.
In the 1950’s Nehru realized, as he carried out in a letter to a member
of the Chinese authority, that India very well understood the problems China was
facing after the prolong suffer and struggle against Japan. He also understood
that the successful communist revolution in China added new feeling to the
political palette of China. Thus he perceived it as a “mixture of bitterness,
elation and vaunting confidence to which the traditional xenophobia and
present day isolation from outside contacts have added suspicion of the motives
of other powers” (Brecher, 1959). For two years he elaborated on these points,
when describing China as on object of study by India’s Intelligence Bureau. In a
briefing he told IB officers that during centuries Indian and Chinese cultures
had contested for supremacy in Central Asia and Tibet, as well as in Burma and
other places in Southeast Asia. Thus, conflict between India and China had never
been direct, but there had been intense indirect competition, which was
continuing (Hoffmann, 1990).
Furthermore, China had shown the tendency to be “aggressive” (Maxwell,
1970).
On the coarse of logic, it was expected that once China had achieved a
certain political and economic stability, it would seek some form of supremacy,
and influence or even supremacy in Asia. And what lay in the path of the
realization of this idea was India. Nehru was afraid that to achieve their ends,
the Chinese might attempt to prove their superiority over India in the sphere of
political and economic might or even occupy some Southeast Asian countries. A
tool that the Chinese might have used, according to Nehru, was the strong lobby
of the Communist party which could stand up and support the Chinese cause in any
dispute with India’s government (Maxwell, 1970).
From Nehru’s standpoint, China’s emergence from the bonds of Western
imperialism could release negative political and character traits. India would
have to be alert, especially on the northern frontier. In 1952 China had no
immediate intention to recognize the India-Tibet border formally. He expected
China to extend its influence over frontier territory once the Chinese position
in Tibet had been consolidated. And as a contra action of that he developed
India’s frontier administration (Maxwell, 1970).
Throughout most of the 1950’s, however, other beliefs received more
emphasis both ion the public and the private spheres. Nehru along with Menon and
other high officials that a friendly relationship between China and India could
be established, if Tibet was removed as an irritant and China was brought out of
isolation into a world of emerging or reemerging nation (Hoffmann, 1990). Nehru
knew that the outcome of such a relationship will bring much to do peace in Asia
and that is the reason he considered it to outweigh his concerns about Tibet.
The founding belief of Nehru was that Tibet was a part of China, “although it
should be allowed as much autonomy as possible” (Hoffmann, 1990). India had
formally recognized China’s right on Tibet and after 1954 was bound to do so
with a the Sino-Indian trade agreement.
After Nehru returned from a visit to China in 1954 he spoke of the great
Chinese achievements in both the economic and social spheres. But even before
that trip Nehru has sought to follow the Chinese steps of progress; that is,
“India should regard China as a standard of comparison not as open rival”
(Hoffmann, 1990). India would follow its own unique strategy of economic
development. That particular strategy called for “government-directed economic
planning, a government-controlled public sector of utilities and industries, and
a cooperative but independent private sector” (Hoffmann, 1990).
The climax of the conflict, as to Nehru, came in the fall of 1959 when
China’s behavior which through his “attitudinal prism” led him to alter the
previous image of China. The final and most serious border problem completed a
intensifying process where Nehru adopted a new set of beliefs concerning the
Chinese beliefs concerning Chinese motives for starting the border conflict.
Those beliefs were firstly that China was definitely acting “arrogant” and
imbued with feelings of superiority. The second belief was that China was a
revolutionary and unsatisfied power which at the time was in aggressive mood.
Third belief was that China was an expansionist country, which meanwhile was
strong internally. Fourth came the belief that Chinas attempt to influence and
pressure India was due to Communist ideology. The fifth believe was that all
these previously mentioned traits have been strengthened by the recent isolation
imposed on China by the West. Paranoidity and one-track mind was the sixth
believe. And following from the latter believe came idea that China would,
therefore, not be interested in the kind of border settlement that India could
accept (Hoffmann, 1990). Thus Prime Minister Nehru pictured China as a hostile
country predisposed to harm India and the strength of deep-seated emotions.
The Sino-Indian border problem seen through the “attitudinal prism” of
Defense Minister Krishna Menon was different from Nehru’s view. Even though
Menon and Nehru were on the same side of the battle, they indeed shared some
differences. While Nehru was following the concepts of Marxism and Leninism,
Menon pursued “Laski’s neo-Marxism” of the 1930’s (Langyel, 1962). In that way
he retained a basic acceptance of the Leninist theory of imperialism which
according to Menon outgrew capitalism. The Defense Minister’s images of India’s
neighbors were also strongly influenced by his distrust of imperialism and
capitalism. The “central place of Menon’s assault of Imperialism in the 1950’s
and 1960’s was prescribed to the United States, which in the eyes of Menon was
the major Western power which was inclined to intervene in the affairs of the
non-Western world” (Langyel, 1962). Due to that he considered not China, but
Pakistan to be the main threat to India’s security. For Pakistan, after
independence, ha d become tied up to the new American imperialist system through
a treaty and the acceptance of military aid. As an American client Pakistan
weakened the area of peace and served the instrument with which imperialism
could threat India’s security.
In contrast to Nehru’s vision of China, Krishna Menon had a very
positive image it. Although he rejected totalitarian methods anywhere he viewed
China as a progressive, modern and socialist state. The Defense Minister also
felt a kind of “spiritual kinship” with China (Langyel, 1962). And even when the
India-China relations edged in 1959 Menon still regarded China as all but an
enemy. In stead he argued that the boarder incidents rose from the fact that
China considered that the Tibetan refugees in India might return to Tibet and
start a rebellion. Other Chinese motives underlying the border problem,
according to Menon, were firstly that a certain Chinese “despondency” over
internal economic problems existed and secondly the youthful, aggressive passion
of the Chinese revolution (Langyel, 1962). All through the pre-crisis period
Krishna Menon believed that frustration caused by the international isolation
imposed on communist China was the factor which aided and guided the formation
of the Japanese attitudes.
Throughout the whole conflict he remained certain that China had taken
India mistakenly as representing threat from the imperialist West.
On the question how to deal with the Sino-Indian conflict, Menon became
the leading defender of a new school of thought. To that school the territorial
disagreement between China and India was genuine, and not a reflection of deeper
Chinese hostility.
According to the school a political settlement with the Chinese could be
reached and might also include territorial compromise (Langyel, 1962).
In the political battle between India and China a lot of hard decisions
had to be made. The authority of decision-making, as we saw, laid mainly in the
hands of a few people in the high levels of the Indian authority building.
Their appropriate actions in the Sino-Chinese border problem were of crucial
importance. Some of them were hard to be taken, others were voted secretly and
even some decisions were left undecided. India’s correct evaluation of its
conflict with China enabled her to act accordingly and carry out its plans in
such a chronological order that would be best for its national security. The
importance of correct decision-making and the ability to choose right from wrong
is the single most important feature each political leader should try to control
to the rate of perfection.
Sources of Information:
Brecher, Michael. (1959). Nehru: A Political Bibliography. Oxford University
Press: London.
Dutt, Rajani Palme. (1943). The Problem of India. International Publishers: New
York
Gopal, Sarvepolli. (1980). Jawaharlal Nehru. Oxford University Press: Delhi.
Hoffmann, Steven. (1990). India & China in Crisis. University of California
Press: London.
Langyel, Emil. (1962). Krishna Menon. Walker & Company: New York
Maxwell, Neville. (1970). India’s China War. Pantheon Books: New York.